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NOTES AND COMMENT
2. The decree of the Court could be enforced with con-
venience, efficiency, and justice.1 4
3. Special remedies provided by the laws of the state or
county to which the foreign corporation owes its exist-
ence are not involved.15
4. There would be no attempt to adjudicate the power given
to the foreign corporation by the state to which it owes
its existence.10
HARRY F. SCHROEDER.
EVIDENCE-PRSUMPTIONS-PREJMPTION OF SUICIDE-
PRESUMPTION OF INNOCENCE.
The force of dicta as judicial authority is irregular and uncer-
tain. Sometimes it has almost the binding authority of settled law;
again it will be referred to only to be distinguished.' The weight
given to it is determined in part by the court which issued it, the
personal eminence of the justices in that court, and the force and
certainty of the rule to which it relates.
In People v. Miller2 the New York Court of Appeals, speak-
ing through its Chief judge, expressed dissatisfaction with, and
an intention to abandon, a rule of the law of evidence, which this
same Court, not ten years prior thereto,3 had found occasion to
acknowledge and affirm. While it is true that this expression of
disapprobation was unnecessary to the decision, and hence only
dictum, there are, we think, few students of the law who would
not view this case as overruling the former decision. Assuming
therefore, if we may, that this is true, it behooves us to examine
the rule of law which the Court has seen fit to repudiate.
In People v. Creasy4 the defendant was tried for the murder
of his fiance; the defense was suicide. The facts were such that
only one of two possibilities could have occurred. Either he mur-
dered her or she committed suicide. The jury was instructed as
', Supra note 2.
'Supra note 5.
" Supra note 7.
5 Amer. & Eng. Cyc. of Law 661; 15 C. J. 950, §344; Rush v. French,
1 Ariz. 991, 25 Pac. 815 (1874).
"257 N. Y. 54, 177 N. E. 306 (1931).
'People v. Creasy, 236 N. Y. 205, 140 N. E. 563 (1923). It will be noted
that of the seven judges then sitting, three are on the court which decided
People v. Miller, viz. Cardozo, Pound and Crane, JU. Since Pound and Crane
dissented, and voted to affirm the conviction, only the present chief judge can
be construed to have assented to that holding.
'Ibid.
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to the presumption of the defendant's innocence. Defendant's coun-
sel requested the Judge to charge that since the defendant must be
presumed to be innocent, and since the only possibility other than
murder by the defendant was suicide by the deceased, the jury must
begin its consideration of the case with a presumption that the de-
ceased did commit suicide. This the trial Judge refused to do, and
this refusal was made one of the grounds for reversal. The Court
of Appeals seemed to feel that to deprive the defendant of the
presumption of suicide would tend to diminish the force of the
presumption of innocence, for if he were innocent, under the facts
in the case, she must have committed suicide. The Court, referring
to the requested charge, said: 1
"To refuse it was equivalent to denying to the defen-
dant the mantle of protection which the law gave him and
allowed the jury to commence its deliberations without a
presumption in favor of his innocence."
In People v. Miller 6 the trial Court, following the rule laid
down in the Creasy case, charged the jury that they must presume
that the deceased committed suicide. Neither prosecution nor de-
fence appealed from this ruling, but the Court of Appeals, in affirm-
ing the conviction, said: 7
"Upon reconsideration of the doctrine of that case, we
are unanimously of the opinion that to the extent of its rec-
ognition of a presumption of suicide it should now be dis-
approved. There is indeed a presumption in the absence of
exculpatory evidence that death was not caused by the crim-
inal act of the defendant, for this is merely a restatement
in another form of the presumption of innocence. There is
no presumption that it was caused in any particular way. * * *"
That the holding in the Creasy case was based on an immature
consideration of elementary rules of evidence becomes evident on
closer analysis. Undoubtedly the defendant was entitled to the pre-
sumption of innocence.8 This is the strongest presumption in the
law, and cannot be overcome nor its force diminished by other
Ibid. at 223, 140 N. E. at 569.
'Supra note 2.
'Supra note 2 at 61; 177 N. E. at 309.
8 Coffin v. U. S., 156 U. S. 432, 154 Sup. Ct. 394, 39 L. ed. 481 (1894);
People v. Roach, 215 N. Y. 592, 109 N. E. 618, Ann. Cas. 1917A 410 (1915);
16 C. J. 534, §1006.
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presumptions.9 There exists also a presumption that one does not
commit suicide, 10 but this presumption is confined to civil cases;
there is no presumption against suicide in criminal cases.'" The
reason for this is well set forth in Persons v. State: 12
"It is contended that rules of evidence are the same in
civil and criminal cases. Such is the general rule but it does
not follow because the rule is the same, that presumptions
applicable in the one are always applicable in the other, for
an antagonistic presumption may exist, and does, in criminal
cases, that is, the innocence of the defendant. That pre-
sumption of innocence does not allow the presumption of any
fact against it. So the presumption that a deceased did not
commit suicide cannot be applied in criminal cases against
the presumption of innocence."
In this case the facts were quite like those in the Creasy case, and
the trial Judge charged the jury that "* * * you are to presume that
4 * * she did not die by her own hand. In all cases of sudden death
the presumption of love of life negatives the idea of suicide." 13
This charge constituted reversible error.
This then is the situation. Deceased either committed suicide
or was murdered by the defendant. We must presume that the de-
fendant did not murder the deceased. Query, Must we then pre-
sume that the deceased committed suicide? At first blush it would
appear illogical to hold otherwise, but we must not overlook the
'Dunlop v. U. S. 165 U. S. 486, 17 Sup. Ct 375, 41 L. ed. 799 (1897);
Dalton v. U. S, 154 Fed. 461, 83 C. C. A. 317 (C. C. A. 7th, 1907); People
v. Scott, 22 Cal. App. 54, 133 Pac. 496 (1913) ; State v. Roswell, 153 Mo. App.
338, 133 S. W. 99 (1910) ; Persons v. State, infra note 12. In re Eichler, 84
Misc. 667, 146 N. Y. Supp. 846 (1914). Contra: 16 C. J. 542, §1033 citing
Hemingway v. State, 68 Miss. 371, 8 So. 317 (1890). This case seems to be
against the weight of authority and a decisioi directly opposite to that taken
by the Court in the Hemingway case was arrived at in State v. Shelley, 166
Mo. 616, 66 S. W. 430 (1902).
"Travelers' Ins. Co. v. McConkey, 127 U. S. 661, 8 Sup. Ct. 1360 (1887);
Mallory v. Travelers' Ins. Co., 47 N. Y. 52 (1871); De Van v. Com. Tras.
Soc., 92 Hun 256, aff'd, 157 N. Y. 690 (1898) : Modern Brotherhood of America
v. White, 66 Okla. 241, 16S Pac. 794, L. R. A. 1918B, 520 (1917).
1 Persons v. State, infra note 12; People v. Creasy, supra note 3 at 223.
We have been unable to find any criminal case wherein the jury was charged
that there existed a presumption against suicide. In State v. Bauerle, 145 Mo.
1, 46 S. W. 609 (1898) the Court said: "While the law presumes the defendant
innocent, there is also a strong presumption against suicide; and while this
presumption does not overcome the presumption of innocence, the jury, as
rational men, are not expected to disregard it." But even here the record does
not show that the jury was charged of a presumption against suicide, and it is
possible that the Court merely referred to an inference that might be drawn
rather than a charge given. See also State v. Krampe, 161 Iowa 48, 140 N. V.
898 (1913) misconstruing State v. Brown, 152 Iowa 427, 132 N. W. 862 (1911).
1 90 Tenn. (60 Pickle) 291, 295, 16 S. W. 726, 727 (1891).
" Supra note 12 at 293, 16 S. W. at 726.
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basic difference between a presumption of law and an inference. A
presumption of law is an inference that the jury must make,1 4 viz.,
they must presume the defendant is innocent, but while so presum-
ing they may infer that the deceased committed suicide. But the
mere fact that such inference may be made does not of itself entitle
the defendant to a charge that they, the jury, must so infer.
The use of a presumption of suicide would also be contrary to
the fundamental reason which prompted its introduction into the
law of evidence. Human experience has taught us that when certain
facts are shown to exist, we may presume the existence of other
facts which are known generally to be concomitant with the first
facts.' 5 The universal knowledge of the love of life has led to
the presumption that one does not commit suicide.' 6 What facts
are within our knowledge which would lead us to presume that a
person would commit suicide? There are none, indeed the evidence
is all to the contrary, and the only argument for it proceeds from
another presumption, that of innocence. If a jury is not permitted
to draw inferences from inferences, it should not be ordered to
build presumptions on presumptions.
THOMAS M. MCDADE.
INSURANCE-EFFECT OF MISSTATEMENT OF OWNERSHIP ON RIGHTS
OF MORTGAGEE UNDER STANDARD MORTGAGEE CLAUSE.
The primary purpose of insurance under a mortgagee clause
is to insure the equitable interest of the mortgagee, who, in practi-
cally all instances, does not occupy the insured premises. The own-
ership of the premises may be transferred without his consent.
While a mortgagee can take out a separate policy on his interest,
insurance companies have prepared mortgagee clauses to protect
the interest of the mortgagee. In the recent case of Goldstein v.
National Liberty Insurance Company of America, et al.,' the Court
of Appeals was confronted with the problem of deciding whether
or not a mortgagee under a mortgagee clause would be prevented
from recovering for a fire loss, where the ownership of the prem-
ises was misrepresented in a policy which provided for its voidance
if the interest of the insured were other than unconditional and
sole ownership.
"Sun Mut. Ins. Co. v. Ocean Ins. Co., 107 U. S. 485, 1 Sup. Ct. 582,
27 L. ed. 337 (1882); Platt v. Elias, 186 N. Y. 374, 79 N. E. 1 (1906);
(1926) 11 CORN. L. Q. 20. For a critical analysis of this definition see Thayer,
Presumptiot and the Law of Evidence (1889) 3 HARV. L. Rnv. 148 et seq.;
HAYES, CASES ON EVIDENCE (1898) 79.
' Spra note 14.10Supra note 10.
1256 N. Y. 26, 175 N. E. 359 (1931).
